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INTRODUCTION
“Cyberspace.” It is difficult to define, notwithstanding its
ubiquitous nature, perhaps because of its mutable characteristics.1 At the
same time, cyberspace makes the Internet unique as “an inherently
borderless medium of communication.”2 The Internet has undeniably
become a global digital phenomenon.
Trying to define cyberspace in clear terms is challenging. One
court defined it as a “world of electronic communications over computer
networks.”3 Scholars prefer a more complex definition, referring to a
cyberspace as an “evolving man-made domain for the organization and
transfer of data . . . a combination of private and public property
governed by technical rule sets designed primarily to facilitate the flow
of information.”4
Cyberspace is consistently growing, with at times unidentifiable
interconnections, most of it in the private sector.5 Thus, establishing a
national framework for cybersecurity is no easy task.6 A coherent
framework, however, is necessary7 and important, as “thousands of
interconnected computers, servers, routers, switches and fiber optic
cables” that comprise cyberspace are crucial for the proper functioning
of critical infrastructures.8 Cyberattacks can instantaneously cross
international borders through cyberspace, implicating computers in
countries long distances apart.9 A more defined structure would make it

1. See Lance Strate, The Varieties of Cyberspace: Problems in Definition and
Delimitation, 63 W. J. OF COMM. 382, 382–83 (1999).
2. Susanna Bagdasarova, Brave New World: Challenges in International Cybersecurity
Strategy and the Need for Centralized Governance, 119 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1005, 1012 (2015)
(citing Jessica E. Bauml, It's a Mad, Mad Internet: Globalization and the Challenges
Presented by Internet Censorship, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 697, 703 (2011)).
3. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1365 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
4. Bagdasarova, supra note 2, at 1010–11 (quoting Graham H. Todd, Armed Attack in
Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare with an Asymmetric Definition, 64 A.F. L. REV .
65, 68 (2009)).
5. ERIC A. FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32777, CREATING A NATIONAL
FRAMEWORK FOR CYBERSECURITY: AN ANALYSIS OF ISSUES AND OPTIONS 6 (2005),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32777.pdf.
6. See id.
7. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE vii (Feb. 2003),
https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cyberspace_strategy.pdf.
8. Id. at vii.
9. Mark Landler & John Markoff, Digital Fears Emerge After Data Siege in Estonia,
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/technology/
29estonia.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (in the April 2007 cyber attack on Estonia's networks,
a network of bots located as far away as Vietnam or the United States were used to increase
the assault’s impact).
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easier to react to such unusual circumstances.10
Security risks have grown exponentially with the use of the Internet
and data storage systems.11 Cybercrime is now abundant in cyberspace,
harming the world’s economy and costing billions of dollars in
damages.12 In response to cyber threats, the international community
has responded with an array of solutions, including international
conventions, national strategies, agreements, summits, and
organizations.13 Unfortunately, all of them lack coherent and mutual
structure.
China, the second largest economy in the world, has the most
Internet users.14 It is an undeniably important participant in the global
cyber community. The country represents nearly twenty-two percent of
total users with more than the United States of America, India, and Japan
combined.15 As of 2017, the United States had over a quarter-billion of
the world’s Internet users, and is now third only behind China and
India.16 Therefore, the strategies and cybersecurity regulations of China
and the United States can provide necessary insights into the nature of
cybersecurity policies in general. They also reveal flaws in an area so
important to the world’s economic development and international
cooperation.
Chinese views on cybersecurity and threats of terrorism provide us
with some helpful insights.17 The outward unanimous support of China’s
official goal of cyber sovereignty suggests that a change in their current
position is unlikely.18 Thus, the People’s Republic of China (the PRC)

10. FISHER, supra note 5 at 6–7.
11. Id. at 8.
12. Id. at 13; Jeff Kosseff, The Cybersecurity Privilege, 12 I/S: J.L. & POL’ Y FOR INFO.
SOC’Y 261 (2016); Emmanuel Darmois & Geneviève Schméder, Cybersecurity: A Case for a
European Approach, 7 (2016), http://www.securityintransition.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/02/WP11_Cybersecurity_FinalEditedVersion.pdf.
13. William M. Stahl, Note, The Uncharted Waters of Cyberspace: Applying the
Principles of International Maritime Law to the Problem of Cybersecurity, 40 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 247, 263–65 (2011).
14. Internet Users by Country, INTERNETLIVESTATS.COM (last visited Jan. 13, 2017),
http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/.
15. Id.
16. Top 20 Countries with the Highest Number of Internet Users,
INTERNETWORLDSTATS.COM (June 30, 2017), http://www.internetworldstats.com/
top20.htm.
17. Michael D. Swaine, Chinese Views on Cybersecurity in Foreign Relations, China
Leadership Monitor no. 42, Oct. 7, 2013, at 16, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/
CLM42MS_092013Carnegie.pdf.
18. Id.; “China is a high context society in which most people share a common set of
norms, values, and beliefs.” DANIEL C.K. CHOW & ANNA M. HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN
CHINA: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 63 (2012).
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will likely continue to improve their cyber capabilities for both national
security and economic purposes.19
This comment talks about the tension between the United States and
China over cybersecurity and its impact on international trade.20 The
comment then discusses the most pressing concerns resulting from
China’s new controversial Cybersecurity Law (the CSL), enacted on
November 7, 2016.21 Finally, this comment proposes for global powers
like China and the United States, to adopt an integrated European Union
(the EU) style approach to cyber security, which rejects “technological
determinism and mass surveillance.”22
II. BACKGROUND
A. Cybersecurity tensions between the U.S. and China
The USA National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
provides a useful definition of cybersecurity: “[t]he ability to protect or
defend the use of cyberspace from cyber attacks.”23 The world’s two
major powers, the United States of America and China are both equipped
for aggressive cyber-war.24 Such power comes with enormous
responsibilities.
Thus, it is important to distinguish who is using cyber warfare
capabilities and for what purposes.25 Does the country use its abilities to
push political agendas against civil societies?26 Does the country have a
genuine policy of using its cyber skills to defend its citizens?27 Or, more
realistically, does it employ both strategies? Both the United States and
China are known for their use of cyber security “in the name of the fight
against terrorism.”28 However, the Snowden revelations brought the
degree of U.S. secret illegal cyberspace operations to light.29 To which

19. Swaine, supra note 17, at 16.
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. Darmois & Schmeder, supra note 12, at 5; see infra Part V.
23. Darmois & Schmeder, supra note 12, at 5 (citing Richard Kissel, Glossary of Key
Information Security Terms, 58 (May 2013), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2013/
NIST.IR.7298r2.pdf.
24. See id.; see also John R. Lindsey, Inflated Cybersecurity Threat Escalates US-China
Mistrust, HUFFPOST (last visited Feb. 17, 2018) https://www.huffingtonpost.com/jon-rlindsay/cybersecurity-threat-escalates-us-china-mistrust_b_7302282.html.
25. Darmois & Schmeder, supra note 12, at 9.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 10.
29. Ewen Macaskill & Gabriel Dance, NSA Files: Decoded, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 1,
2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-
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the global community questioned U.S. compliance with democratic
principles.30
The revelations showed that the National Security Agency targeted
not only other countries, but also ordinary citizens, making the life of
active participants in civil society more difficult.31 The United States’
use of counter-technology is an example of the blurred lines between the
government’s goal of preventing terrorist attacks and public use of
protective technologies.32 Likewise, in China, the true motives behind
cybersecurity regulations are often unclear.
The views on cybersecurity between the United States and China
differ starting at the basic ideological level. From an American
perspective, the ideal Internet is an open, secure platform, free for all to
enjoy.33 The Chinese start from a completely different position.34 The
Chinese government decided a long time ago that it wants to be in
“control of the narrative about . . . China’s rise.”35 China wants to be
completely independent from other countries, which largely prompted
the idea of cyber sovereignty within the country.
Independence, innovation, and inner prosperity push the Chinese
government to do so.36 Wariness of the technology trap and a desire to
transcend their manufacturing economy motivates China’s impatience
and enormous investment in Research and Development.37 An ambition
for self-sufficiency38 also explains China’s alleged hacking, spying, and
stealing of important corporate data by the PRC intelligence.39
The Snowden revelations put the United States in an interesting
position, to say the least.40 China had always assumed that the United
States was hacking into their networks even before the revelations.41 The
NSA and other government agencies were, in fact, breaking into Chinese
surveillance-revelations-decoded#section/1.
30. Darmois & Schmeder, supra note 12, at 10.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. The Christian Science Monitor, Cybersecurity from China’s Perspective, YOUTUBE
(Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XINwf7xj5to&t=292s [hereinafter
Science Monitor].
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see generally Justin Yifu Lin, Economic Growth and Development, in
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE CHINESE ECONOMY 76–89 (Gregory C. Chow & Dwight H.
Perkins eds., 2015) (describing the reasons for and costs of China’s transition to a dynamic
economy).
38. CHOW & HAN, supra note 18, at 15.
39. See Science Monitor, supra note 33.
40. See generally Macaskill, supra note 29.
41. See Science Monitor, supra note 33.
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networks in search of political and military secrets.42 Curiously, the U.S.
government differentiates between good hacking and bad hacking, with
political espionage considered good.43 Bad hacking, accordingly, occurs
when, for instance, the Chinese allegedly hack into a foreign company’s
network to steal intellectual property to help domestic private and state
owned companies become more competitive and independent.44
As a dim glimmer of hope, the two countries have finally tried to
work out some of the pressing cybersecurity issues. In 2015, President
of China, Xi Jinping, while visiting the U.S., signed a cyber agreement
that prohibits both countries from knowingly supporting cyber theft of
intellectual property for the economic advantage of domestic
companies.45 The 2015 visit was a success, considering that just two
years prior, at a summit in California, the two presidents could not reach
any consensus on cybersecurity.46
China’s alleged cyber attacks have worried both the United States
and the international community for quite some time.47 The Wall Street
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See John W. Rollins, U.S.–China Cyber Agreement, CRS INSIGHT (Oct. 16, 2015),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IN10376.pdf; accord Julie Hirshfield Davis & David E. Sanger,
Obama and Xi Jinping of China Agree to Take Steps on Cybertheft, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-white-house.html; accord
Demetri Sevastopulo & Geoff Dyer, Obama and Xi in deal on cyber espionage, FINANCIAL
TIMES
(Sept.
25,
2015),
https://www.ft.com/content/0dbcab36-63be-11e5-a28b50226830d644.
46. Compare Gary Brown & Christopher D. Yung, Evaluating the US-China
Cybersecurity Agreement, THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 19, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/
2017/01/evaluating-the-us-china-cybersecurity-agreement-part-1-the-us-approach-tocyberspace/ (supporting the claim that a first agreement of its kind, reached during the 2015
Chinese President’s United States visit, was a positive step), with SCOTT WARREN HARROLD
ET AL., GETTING TO YES WITH CHINA IN CYBERSPACE 10 (2016), https://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1300/RR1335/RAND_RR1335.pdf (concluding
that the results of the 2013 summit were exiguous because of China’s denial of cyber
espionage); and Charles Riley, Obama and Xi fail to bridge cybersecurity gap, CNN MONEY
U.S. (June 10, 2013, 5:38 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/06/10/news/obama-chinacybersecurity (“no firm commitments on cyber-related issues were secured at the
conference”).
47. See Magnus Hjortdal, China's Use of Cyber Warfare: Espionage Meets Strategic
Deterrence, 4 J. OF STRATEGIC SECURITY 6 (2011), http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/
jss/vol4/iss2/2 (last visited Dec 28, 2016); see also Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Deterrence, 26
Emory Int'l L. Rev. 733, 784–86 (2012) (citing China, Not India, Behind Cyber Attacks: US,
HINDUSTAN TIMES (India) (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.hindustantimes.com/worldnews/Europe/China-not-India-behind-cyber-attack-US/Articlel -800051.aspx, and Charles
Arthur, China 'Targeted 48 Chemical and Military Companies in Hacking Attack, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 1, 2011), http://www. guardian. co.uk/technology/2011 /nov/01 /china-hackingchemical- military-companies) (naming several instances of cyber-attacks linked to China but
disguised as coming from other sources); for a discussion of China’s harmful cyber attacks
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Journal (the WSJ) in its article on the world’s cyber forces stated that
China “[o]ften uses high-volume attacks with a large number of
operatives in military or outside groups linked to [the] government who
bombard targets.”48 According to the WSJ, a list of suspected acts by the
Chinese in recent years includes:
2009: Theft of data from Google Inc. and other tech companies.
2009: Discovery of theft of plans for U.S. Joint Strike Fighter
project.
2010: Attacks on British executives.
2011: Attack on South Korean Internet portal.
2013: Major U.S. media companies hacked.
2015: “Great Cannon” directs massive amounts of traffic to take
anticensorship websites offline.
2015: Hack of U.S. Office of Personnel Management.49

Particularly, China has often been a suspect of industrial espionage
aimed at increasing its competitiveness globally.50
Although, the United States is no innocent bystander when it comes
to hacking.51 The WSJ talks about the United States’ cyber warfare
capabilities, as headed by the NSA and Cyber Command.52 The United
States’ attacks are known for their complexity and sophisticated
techniques, as the country has been active in the field for nearly two
decades.53 The list of suspected acts includes:
2010: Discovery of computer worm that destroyed centrifuges at
Iranian nuclear plant.
2010: Surveillance of EU offices.
2011: Attack on Gemalto, a European maker of mobile SIM cards,

against the United States see Jack Goldsmith, How Cyber Changes the Laws of War, 24 Eur.
J. Int'l L. 129, 131 (2013).
48. Jenifer Valentino-Devries & Danny Yadron, Cataloging the World's Cyberforces,
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 11, 2015, 8:45 PM) http://www.wsj.com/articles/
cataloging-the-worlds-cyberforces-1444610710.
49. See id. (Hydraq, which was found in Google attack and others, and Sakula, which
was found in OPM attack and others, were identified as malware used in those attacks).
50. RICHARD STIENNON, SURVIVING CYBERWAR 49, 15 (2010); Gordon G. Chang,
Obama’s Summit with Xi Jingping: Where’s the Tough Love?, THE DAILY BEAST (Jun. 9,
2013, 4:45 AM), http:// www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/09/obama-s-summit-withxi-jinping-where-s-the-tough-love.html (according to some of the estimates by government
officials, intellectual property theft, ascribed to alleged Chinese hackers, causes U.S.
companies to lose $250 billion each year).
51. Jyh-An Lee, The Red Storm in Uncharted Waters: China and International Cyber
Security, 82 UMKC L. Rev. 951, 953 (2014).
52. See Valentino-Devries & Yadron, supra note 48.
53. See id.
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likely with Britain’s GCHQ.”54

Flame, a type of espionage malware; Stuxnet, used in the Iranian
attack; and GrayFish, a high-level malware able to attack computer
“firmware” at the heart of the computer’s hard drive and resurrect itself,
are only some used by the US intelligence.55
Considering that the PRC has impressive capabilities of aggressive
cyber-intrusion, nations cannot simply ignore the possible threat of cyber
attacks on their networks.56 In addition to targeting governments, the
alleged Chinese attackers infiltrate private sector companies.57 Some
American enterprises, which have become victims of cyber attacks in the
recent years, include Apple, Facebook, Google, Twitter, and the
Washington Post.58
As mentioned earlier, China sees itself not as an initiator, but rather
a victim of the cyber attacks, often condemning similar hacking by the
United States of Chinese computer systems.59 And in fact, the
modernization of Chinese cyber weapons and improvement of its
hacking abilities is prescribed due to “pressures caused by American
technological power.”60
On an optimistic note, both powers have shown initiative and
willingness to engage in the common resolution of cybersecurity
issues.61 As both the U.S. and China understand that setting international
rules for cybersecurity is important, they seem to be willing to
cooperate. 62

54. Id.
55. Id.; see also Lee, supra note 51, at 953 (citing Ron Rosenbaum, Richard Clarke on
Who Was Behind the Stuxnet Attack, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Apr. 2012), http://
www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/Richard-Clarke-on-Who-Was-Behind-theStuxnet-Attack.html).
56. See Hjortdal, supra note 47, at 6 (citing China: Pushing Ahead of the Cyberwarfare
Pack, STRATFOR (Mar. 2, 2009, 3:27 PM), https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/chinapushing-ahead-cyberwarfare-pack) (“Analysts say that China could well have the most
extensive and aggressive cyber warfare capability in the world.”).
57. Lee, supra note 51, at 954.
58. Stephen Moore, Cyber Attacks and the Beginnings of an International Cyber Treaty,
39 N.C.J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 223, 253 (2014); Riley, supra note 46.
59. Lee, supra note 51, at 957–58.
60. Id. at 958.
61. Lee, supra note 51, at 958.
62. See id. at 958. For a statement by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang on the need to make
fewer accusations and contribute more to cybersecurity, see Terril Yue Jones and Benjamin
Kang Lim, China's New Premier Seeks “New Type” of Ties with U.S., REUTERS(Mar. 17,
2013, 4:02 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-hacking/chinas-newpremier-seeks-new-type-of-ties-with-u-s-idUSBRE92G02320130317.
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1. Cultural factors, which impacted China’s new Cybersecurity
Law.
The PRC has been a state-controlled economy since its founding in
1948 until 1978 when economic reforms took place.63 The state
controlled capital apportionment for investment in business
enterprises.64 Banks mostly lent money to enterprises not to increase
productivity, but rather for political reasons.65 The apparent preference,
given to domestic companies in China, also dates back to the emphasis
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as “essential units of the state and the
foundation of the economy.”66
During the 1949–1978 period, China did not engage in foreign trade
with other nations with a few slight exceptions.67 The country’s focus
was mainly inward.68 This isolationism, typical of the present day
economic policies, developed because foreign imperial powers
dominated the country from 1850 to 1949 and suppressed China’s
power.69
Because of the political chaos and unwise economic policies, before
the economic reforms were promulgated in 1978, China’s economy
suffered from stagnation, inefficiency, and almost no economic
growth.70
Considering such a turbulent history and weak economic state,
China’s transition to one of the fastest growing economies in only three
decades is noteworthy.71 However, with a population of approximately
1.331 billion and a Gross Domestic Product of $5.11 trillion in 2009,72
China is still a developing country.73 China remains a comparatively
poor country in general, and ranks as one of the world’s lowest-income

63. CHOW & HAN, supra note 18, at 12.
64. Id. at 14 (In the US, by contrast, capital is allocated to enterprises through different
market mechanisms, like the sale of stocks or bonds, venture capital borrowing and
reinvestment of excess earnings).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. CHOW & HAN, supra note 18, at 15.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 16–17.
71. CHOW & HAN, supra note 18, at 19 (with nearly 10 percent growth rate on average,
such dramatic improvement is unprecedented).
72. The World Bank, China, http://data.worldbank.org/country/china (last visited Jan. 3,
2018).
73. Bauml, supra note 2, at 724 (citing International Monetary Fund, Restoring
Confidence Without Harming Recovery 2, tbl.1 (July 7, 2010), http:// www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/weo/2010/update/02/pdf/0710.pdf).
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countries.74 It is a nation still in search of its ground.75 Thus, holding
China to American democratic standards at this stage might be
unrealistic.76
It is also important to note that the Communist Party, just like the
People’s Action Party of Singapore, has achieved the above-mentioned
economic success without relaxing political control.77 The Communist
Party is likely here to stay.78 It will continue to keep a tight grip on the
economy, at times making decisions that directly affect business
ventures out of purely political ambitions.79 While economic progress
and foreign investment to China drives its global dominance, political
and social stability within the country is its number one priority.80
Likewise, “China’s foreign policy behavior, including its cyber
activity, is driven primarily by the domestic political imperative to
protect the longevity of the Chinese Communist Party.”81 All of the
objectives, such as ensuring stability, territorial integrity, innovation,
and continuing economic growth, while taking steps to prepare for a
possible militarized cyber conflict, support the continuation of the
Communist Party.82 Laws and regulations in China allow for flexibility
of interpretation, which benefits Chinese nation’s interests.83
Preservation of the economic activity through information and
communication technology becomes any nations’ primary objective
when safeguarding cyberspace. 84 Cybersecurity is integral to economic
prosperity,85 which is why countries must secure activities like banking,
services, administration, and so forth, to protect the stakeholders and

74. CHOW & HAN, supra note 18, at 20; see, e.g, Bauml, supra note 2, at 724.
75. See Bauml, supra note 2, at 725.
76. Id.
77. Special Report, The Singapore Exception, THE ECONOMIST (Jul. 18, 2015),
https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21657606-continue-flourish-its-secondhalf-century-south-east-asias-miracle-city-state (“Singapore is [...] the only one among the
world’s richest countries never to have changed its ruling party”); see generally CHOW &
HAN, supra note 18 (noting China’s economic progress over the years despite the strong hold
of the Communist Party on this developing country).
78. CHOW & HAN, supra note 18, at 21.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Amy Chang, Warring State: China’s Cybersecurity Strategy, CTR. FOR A NEW AM.
SECURITY, 7 (Dec. 2014), https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_
WarringState_Chang_report_010615.pdf.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. PASCAL BRANGETTO & MARI KERT-SAINT AUBYN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF
NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY STRATEGIES, PROJECT REPORT, 9 (2015), https://ccdcoe.org/
sites/ default/files/multimedia/pdf/Economics%20of%20cybersecurity.pdf.
85. See id.
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increase their societies’ wealth.86
2. “Made in China” technology protectionism.
After the reforms of 1978, China quickly became an important
player in the world trade market.87 China’s fame as the world’s largest
exporter of goods is familiar to anyone who has ever bought a product
“made in China.”88 The influxes of foreign direct investment and access
to the world’s most valuable technology via multinational companies
(MNC’s) established in China has made China’s foreign trade an engine
of economic development.89 Domestic Chinese enterprises inevitably
absorb the intellectual property of companies entering the Chinese
market and begin to close the technology gap, enabling China to become
Also, the
ever so competitive in the global marketplace.90
undervaluation of the Renminbi allows China to keep its goods at prices,
which are lower than market exchange rate, increasing its exports.91
The common perception in China is that the United States is
constantly critiquing Chinese actions in the world market and its
protection of intellectual property rights.92
Consequently, China is extremely sensitive to any heavy-handed
tactics by foreign countries, which it usually meets with resentment.93
This influences the isolationist view of the Chinese government, which
often feels pressured by other nations into an unwanted westernization
of its principles.
In recent years, the strive for technological independence has led
China to increase its Internet security and to further develop its own
information technology (IT). In the beginning of 2014, China pushed
the development of Chinese operating systems based on Linux.94 The
86. Id.
87. Reuters Staff, TIMELINE: China Milestones Since 1978, REUTERS (DEC. 7, 2008,
11:33 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-reforms-chronology-sb/timeline-chinamilestones-since-1978-idUKTRE4B711V20081208.
88. Investopedia, What Country is the World’s Largest Exporter of Goods? (Jan. 19,
2015, 9:11 AM), http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/011915/what-country-worldslargest-exporter-goods.asp.
89. CHOW & HAN, supra note 18, at 29-30 (if for example, an MNC establishes a
subsidiary in China to manufacture complex machinery, the MNC has to give access to
Chinese counterpart to its proprietary technology).
90. Id. at 319.
91. Id.
92. CHOW & HAN, supra note 18, at 325.
93. Id.
94. Hauke Johannes Gierow, Cyber Security in China: Internet Security, Protectionism
and Competitiveness: New Challenges to Western Businesses, CHINA MONITOR, Issue 2,
(Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2017-09/China_Monitor_22_
Cybersecurity_EN.pdf.
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idea was to run it on computers used in the government sphere and
security relevant businesses.95 China has been enforcing stringent
limitations on the use of foreign tech, fearing network surveillance via
installed back doors and the threat to its national security.96 Sealing off
the internal market from external impacts, promotes policies of industrial
and innovative development and further bolsters the competitiveness of
domestic companies.97 In spite of its great progress in the technological
field, China still depends on foreign high-tech.98
State-run telecommunications companies (China Telecom, China
Unicom, and China Mobile) dominate the market with their
Decisions they make, usually approved by the
investments.99
government, determine what kind of technologies will be developed,
thus defining the framework for the industry and its regulation.100
Additionally, the Chinese government endorses its own technological
standards through state-run programs, generally in close collaboration
with IT companies like ZTE, Lenovo, and Datang Mobile for instance.101
However, it is not clear whether China’s strive for independence will
enhance network security as a whole.102 Unfortunately, many IT
companies in China still ignore crucial quality standards required for
software security.103
The reliance of domestic companies on Chinese encryption
methods poses yet another problem.104 Unlike the international
encryption standards, such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA),105
domestic ones allow only partial protection.106 Chinese suppliers have
to deposit a type of ‘skeleton key’ with the National Encryption Leading
Group, which unsurprisingly gives the government in Beijing access to
important data.107
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Gierow, supra note 92.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Ernst Dieter & Naughton Barry, China’s Emerging Industrial Economy: Insight from
the IT Industry, in CHINA’S EMERGENT POL. ECON.: CAPITALISM IN THE DRAGON’S LAIR, 39,
39–59 (Christopher A. McNally ed., 2008).
101. Gierow, supra note 92.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 3.
105. RSA is a public-key cryptosystem, used for secure data transfer, specifically for data
transmission “over an insecure network such as the Internet.” Margaret Rouse, RSA Algorithm
(Rivest-Shamir-Adleman), TECHTARGET (last visited on Oct. 4, 2017), http://
searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/RSA.
106. Id.
107. Christopher T. Cloutier & Jane Y Cohen, Casting a Wide Net: China’s Encryption
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Starting from 2015, fifteen percent of computers in official offices
across China have started to convert from Windows to Chinese owned
operating systems.108 The Chinese government highly promotes
NeoKylin OS and Red Flag Linux systems.109 The problem is that
Chinese technologies are not reliable yet.110 Compared to Western-run
applications, the alternative operating systems China offers111 have a lot
more security drawbacks with numerous virus-infested apps.112
Mandatory Internet censorship is another problem for Chinese
companies, exacerbating international criticism of isolationism and
protectionism.113 The Chinese government explains that Internet
restrictions, like the blocking of Google and Facebook, promote security
and protect Chinese citizens against terrorism.114 Аbiding by the
Chinese government’s restrictions gets expensive.115 “The existing
Chinese microblogging sites have had to invest in huge armies of
individuals who spend their time looking through the content and
determining what should or shouldn’t be removed.”116 Thus, censorship
affects freedom of speech and impacts the economy of the whole
country.117
Foreign companies unquestionably feel the impact of Chinese
censorship and exposure to cyber attacks.118 International collaboration
with services such as Gmail, Google Docs, and Dropbox are increasingly
restrictions, WORLDECR (Nov. 2011), http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/library/
publication/2011articles/11-11WorldECRCloutierCohen.pdf (For a definition of RSA
algorithm see Margaret Rouse, RSA Algorythm (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman), TECHTARGET.COM
(last visited Jan. 13, 2017), http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/RSA).
108. Gierow, supra note 92, at 4–5.
109. Id. at 3.
110. Id.
111. Gierow, supra note 92, at 4 (Google Play, for example, is blocked in China, so
companies like Baidu, Tencent or Qihoo 360 offer substitute app stores).
112. Id. (citing Max Eddy, Nearly 7,000 Malicious Android Apps Infest China's
Appstores, PCMAG.COM (Aug. 27, 2013, 2:05 PM), http://securitywatch.pcmag.com/mobilesecurity/315218-nearly-7-000-malicious-android-apps-infest-china-s-appstores) (“The Anzhi
and EoeMarket [app] stores were the worst offenders.”).
113. Id.
114. Reuters, China is Another Step Closer to Controversial Cybersecurity Law,
FORTUNE (June 27, 2016, 5:22 AM) http://fortune.com/2016/06/27/china-moves-towardadopting-cybersecurity-law/ [hereinafter Controversial Cybersecurity Law].
115. Victor Luckerson, Why China is a Nightmare for American Internet Companies,
TIME (Feb. 27, 2014), http://time.com/10178/why-china-is-a-nightmare-for-americaninternet-companies/.
116. Id. (quoting Ryan Budish, a fellow at Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet and
Society).
117. Id.
118. See id. (Apple example: Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Apple Addresses iCloud
Attacks While China Denies Hacking Allegations, MASHABLE (Oct. 21, 2014),
http://mashable.com/2014/10/21/apple-icloud-attacks-china/).
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dysfunctional.119 The same goes for virtual private networks (VPNs),
restriction of which “might lead to weaker data security and trade secrets
being leaked to Chinese competitors.”120 "If connections are slow or
VPNs unstable," certain applications that foreign companies use for
work-related purposes cannot always be accessed from China.121 "Even
simply transferring files to colleagues in other countries can be a trying
experience."122
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
There are two main problems in the area of cybersecurity law: 1)
multiple jurisdictions, with different and conflicting laws, fracturing
what should be a "globally integrated public sphere," and 2) "the risk of
authoritarian or repressive regulation by nondemocratic" countries.123
The "piecemeal nature" of international cybersecurity regulations
leaves gaping holes in cybersecurity policy and security.124 To meet
those needs one must approach a "cybersecurity regime not as
geographically divided parts, but as a unified whole in a borderless
cyberspace."125 The world’s super powers, like the United States and
China, should set aside their differences and adopt a more centralized
and mutual approach to cybersecurity. However, unfortunately, it does
not seem likely to happen.
President of the United States Barack Obama when talking about
“norms of state conduct in cyberspace,” said that those norms do not
require swapping a “customary international law” for new regulations.126
He suggested that “[l]ong-standing international norm guiding state
behavior—in times of peace and conflict—[should] also apply to
cyberspace.”127 The term “international norm,” however, as referenced

119. Gierow, supra note 92, at 5.
120. Asia-Pacific News, China Clamping Down on Use of VPNs to Evade Great Firewall,
CNBC (Jul. 20, 2017, 3:17 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/20/china-clamping-downon-use-of-vpns-to-evade-great-firewall.html; see Arthur Charles, China Cracks Down on
VPN Use, THE GUARDIAN (May 13, 2011, 11:41 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2011/may/13/china- cracks-down-on-vpn-use.
121. Gierow, supra note 92, at 5–6.
122. Id.
123. REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: A CALL FOR POLITICAL
INNOVATION, 36–40 (2012).
124. Bagdasarova, supra note 2, at 1009.
125. Id.
126. President of the United States of America, International Strategy For Cyberspace:
Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World 9 (2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cybersp
ace.pdf.
127. Id.

2018]

CHINA'S NEW CYBERSECURITY LAW

151

to cyberspace is not well defined at the moment.128 Right now there are
no set rules as to what is acceptable in cyberspace.129
Certain observers of the Chinese nation believe that the Communist
Party learned invaluable lessons from the collapse of the Soviet Union
and correspondingly changed its ways of ruling for the better.130
However, these days’ people have become less hopeful, saying that the
useful reforms that helped China’s successful rise have passed and “a
new era of hard authoritarianism has begun.”131 Essentially, if the PRC
truly wants to transition to a high-income society, it must undergo at
This would no doubt mean
least partial democratization.132
democratizing China’s cybersecurity strategies.
IV. ANALYSIS
On the New Year’s Eve of 2015, China’s official state media
broadcasted Xi Jinping’s annual message.133 Mr. Xi spoke to his
audience about the year to come, saying that 2016 was going to signify
“the beginning of the decisive phase” of China’s efforts to build a
“moderately prosperous society.”134 Soon after, cybersecurity issues and
enhancement of the protections against hacking and terrorism became
the main focus of the decisive phase President Xi spoke of.135
At the same time, the new Cybersecurity Law (the Law) served as
a confirmation that when it comes to the Internet, China will take an
independent stance.136 The whole host of regulations approved by the
“country’s rubber-stamp Parliament” in 2016, showcase the way
cyberspace is managed there.137 Ironically, comments on Chinese news
and social media sites were largely censored after the state news media
revealed the Law’s enactment.138
128. Lee, supra note 51, at 960.
129. Science Monitor, supra note 33.
130. Chinese Politics, A Crisis of Faith 23, 25, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 16, 2016),
https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21688399-their-response-wobbly-marketschinas-leaders-reveal-their-fears-crisis-faith [hereinafter A Crisis of Faith].
131. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. Id.
133. A Crisis of Faith, supra note 131, at 23.
134. Id.
135. Adam Segal, Chinese Cyber Diplomacy in a New Era of Uncertainty, HOOVER
WORKING GROUP ON NAT’L SECURITY, TECH. & L., Aegis Paper Series No. 1703 (June 2,
2017),
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/segal_chinese_cyber_
diplomacy.pdf.
136. See Paul Mozur, China’s Internet Controls Will Get Stricter, to Dismay of Foreign
Business, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/08/
business/international/china-cyber-security-regulations.html.
137. See id.
138. Id.
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Even before the Law was enacted, it caused an enormous uproar
in the international business community.139 The Head of Asia Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association told a forum in Hong Kong
that the rules in the CSL were “worrying.”140 The expansive Law and
the Anti-Terrorism Law, which took effect on January 1st, 2016.141 The
regulations indicate that the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC)
is ultimately in charge of setting the agenda of the broader set of policies
concerning the CSL.142 The bill affects both domestic and foreign
companies operating in Mainland China and spans over a wide range of
activity in the sphere of the Internet and information communications
technologies.143
The Law is significant in scope and potentially overreaching in
effect.144 As China’s first omnibus privacy and security regulation in the
cyber realm, the CSL increases data protection in many aspects, but
brings possible compliance challenges for the global community.145 It is
particularly worrisome for businesses with “significant online/digital
presence,” enterprises dependent on a telecommunications network, or
the ones who rely on cross-border movement and sharing of business
data.146
James Zimmerman, chairman of the American Chamber of
Commerce in China described the sweeping CSL as “a step backward

139. Reuters, Business Groups Slam China’s Draft Cybersecurity Rules, S. CHINA
MORNING POST (Aug. 12, 2016, 12:47 AM) http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/
article/2002550/business-groups-slam-chinas-draft-cybersecurity-rules (Letters from 46
organizations to premier Li Keqiang said that cybersecurity regulations China was drafting
would constrain trade and urged to revise them).
140. Reuters, China Cybersecurity Law Likely to Harm Foreign Firms Operating on the
Mainland, Says Asia Finance Body Chief, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 8, 2016, 4:25 PM),
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2044033/china-cybersecurity-lawlikely-harm-foreign-firms.
141. Counter-Terrorism Law of the People's Republic of China (Passed by the 18th
Session of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People's Congress on December 27,
2015), https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/反恐怖主义法-（2015), /?lang=en (discussing
Chinas definition of terrorism, placing restrictions on the reporting of terrorist attacks and
requirements for tech companies to provide support for counter-terrorism purposes ); see also
Zunyou Zhou, Chinas Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Law (Jan. 23, 2016),
https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/chinas-comprehensive-counter-terroJan. 23, 2016rism.
142. Mozur, supra note 137.
143. China Adopts a Tough Law, supra note 142.
144. Baker & Mckenzie, Final Passage of China’s Cybersecurity Law (Nov. 25, 2016),
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2016/11/final-passage-of-chinascybersecurity-law/.
145. Gabriela Kennedy & Xiaoyan Zhang, China Passes Cybersecurity Law (Nov. 18,
2016),
https://hk-lexiscn-com.libproxy.scu.edu/topic/legal.php?tps=cp&act=detail&id=
204423&newstype=3&isEnglish=Y.
146. Baker & McKenzie, supra note 158.
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for innovation in China that won’t do much to improve security.”147
According to Chinese officials, the CSL is primarily designed to
strengthen local networks against malicious hacking.148 However, in the
eyes of foreign businesses, this piece of legislation looks very much like
“a techno-nationalist Trojan horse.”149
As a first comprehensive Law on cybersecurity, the CSL’s
provisions are still very general and vague.150 A lot will depend on the
implementing regulations and standards to be issued by the State
Council, the CAC, Ministry of Public Security,151 and the Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology.152
Some of the Law’s content repeats existing rules adopted by China
over the years and simply combines separate regulations into one.153
Prior existing rules were scattered under different regulations.154 The
PRC believes that forming one unified Law improves enforcement and
notifies the business community, as well as the general public, of the
unprecedented cybersecurity threats within and beyond China’s
borders.155 However, the power given to Chinese authorities under the
CSL seems to have no limit.156
1. Protection of key information infrastructure.
Article 31 of the CSL says in part:
The State shall . . . focus on protecting both the key information
infrastructure used for public communications and information
service, energy, transport, water conservancy, finance, public
services, e-government affairs and other important industries and
fields and other key information infrastructure that will result in
serious damage to the national security, national economy and
people’s livelihood and public interests if they are destroyed, there
are lost functions or they are subject to data leakage. The State

147. China Adopts a Tough Law, supra note 142.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Dr. Ulrike Glueck & Sammie Hu, PRC Cyber Security Law—What are the Most
Important Impacts on Foreign Businesses?, LEXICOLOGY (Jul. 3, 2017),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=87d2de53-1499-46f9-8a1d-d5a8886c4d15.
151. Dong, supra note 152, at 2.
152. Baker & McKenzie, supra note 158.
153. Samuel Yang, The New China Cybersecurity Law—Why Companies Should Care
But Not Panic?, ANJIE LAW FIRM (Nov. 14, 2016), https://hk-lexiscncom.libproxy.scu.edu/topic/legal.php?tps=cp&act=detail&id=203916&newstype=3&isEngli
sh=Y.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Kennedy & Zhang, supra note 159.
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encourages network operators other than key information
infrastructure to participate in the protective system of key
information infrastructure on a voluntary basis.157

The CSL introduced the concept of key information infrastructure
(KII) for the first time and imposed a series of heightened obligations for
operators of KII.158 The definition of “key” or “critical,” as certain
sources call it, is broader than anyone expected.159 Although not every
company’s information technology infrastructure will likely be regarded
as a KII, as it appears to be limited to those involving “national security,
national economy and the people’s livelihood, or the public interest.”160
This definition is nevertheless overly broad and the State Council will
have to define a more narrow scope of the KII later.161 The State Council
will also likely have to specify the mandatory security measures that
organizations operating KII will need to apply.162 The government has
considerable leeway to bring industries not specifically singled out in the
definition into the scope of the legislation at a later stage.163 Such leeway
helps the Communist Party to stay in control.164
2. Information and data storage requirements for business
entities.
Article 37 of the CSL says:
Key information infrastructure operators shall store personal
information and important data gathered and produced during
operations within the territory of the People’s Republic of China.
Where it is really necessary to provide such information and data to
overseas parties due to business requirements, a security assessment
shall be conducted in accordance with the measures formulated by
the national cyberspace administration authority in concert with the
relevant departments under the State Council. Where the laws and
administration regulations have other provisions, those provisions

157. The Law, supra note 151.
158. Dong, supra 152, at 3 (this source uses the term critical information infrastructure,
however, different sources use terms “key” and “critical” interchangeably).
159. China Adopts a Tough Law, supra note 142.
160. Yang, supra note 167.
161. Final Cybersecurity Law Enacted in China, Privacy & Information Security Law
Blog (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2016/11/08/final-cybersecuritylaw-enacted-china/ [hereinafter Privacy & Information].
162. Id.
163. Kennedy & Zhang, supra note 159.
164. See National Security, Everything Xi Wants, THE ECONOMIST (Jul. 4, 2015),
https://www.economist.com/news/china/21656689-new-national-security-law-hintscommunist-partys-fears-everything-xi-wants.
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shall prevail.165

The general interpretation of this provision points to the
obligation for foreign companies to keep servers for users in China
within China’s borders.166 Even with an increase in cost, many foreign
companies have already complied with this requirement.167
The overly broad residency requirements place entry obstacles
for both Chinese and foreign entities, which can hinder economic
growth.168 This storage provision separates China from the global digital
economy.169 Positions like this bring China closer to cyber sovereignty
that it desires, but also make companies distrust the safekeeping of their
data while on Chinese territory. Those companies worry that the Law
will require additional expenses and increase the risk of data theft.170
The security assessment provision creates yet another barrier for
businesses who want to break into China’s market.171 Chinese KIIs,
under the literal reading of the CSL, must undergo a stringent assessment
by relevant Chinese authorities prior to any cross-border information
transfer.172 The security assessment requires business entities to identify
the need for data export and creates the risk of personal information
being leaked along with potential compromises to national security.173
Article 38 specifies the requirement for operators of KII to undergo a
network security assessment at least once a year and “submit the
detection and assessment situations as well as improvement measures to
The Secretariat of the National
the relevant departments.”174
Information Security Standardization Technical Committee has issued a
“Draft for Comment” with an October 2017 deadline for concerned
entities to submit opinions on the security assessment of cross-border
information transfer.175 So presently, the Chinese authorities still have
165. The Law, supra 151 (emphasis added).
166. Josh Horwitz, China’s Bewildering New Cybersecurity Law is Keeping Foreign Tech
Firms Out of the Country, QUARTZ (Nov. 7, 2016), http://qz.com/829248/chinas-newcybersecurity-law-is-so-vague-that-its-keeping-foreign-tech-firms-out-of-the-country/ (For
instance AirBnB, over a year after it entered the Chinese market via a joint venture, announced
that it would move its Chinese user data to a Chinese location).
167. Id.
168. Controversial Cybersecurity Law, supra note 112.
169. Id.
170. China Adopts a Tough Law, supra note 142.
171. See Kennedy, supra note 155.
172. Id.
173. China’s Cyber Security Law: With More Questions than Answers, What Steps Can
You Take Now?, MORRISON & FOERSTER (Jul. 31, 2017), https://www.mofo.com/resources/
publications/170731-chinas-cyber-security-law.html.
174. The Law, supra note 151.
175. Comments Sought on the Information Security Technology—Guidelines for Security
Assessment of Data Cross-border Transfer and Other Five National Standards,
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to decide on how, when, and at what cost the security assessments will
take place.
The residency, data storage and security assessment provisions
make it challenging for businesses to operate in China. Underscoring
the possible glooming outcome for many international companies in
China, Baker & McKenzie specialists point out that: “[i]n a worst-case
scenario, many foreign business operators may be required to carve-out
China from their global or regional technology, infrastructure/backbone,
and/or become mired in time-consuming regulatory approvals for the
export or sharing of data with entities outside China.”176
3. A new provision on the protection of network security.
“Networks,” according to Article 76 of the CSL, includes networks
and systems that are composed of computers and other information
terminals or facilities used to “collect, save, transmit, exchange, and
process information.”177 Network operators mandatorily follow all the
legal obligations under the CSL.178 The Law also maintains that
promoting and “safeguarding the national cyberspace sovereignty”
within the networks is a fundamental principle.179
The list of further obligations (and sadly no rights) for network
operators under Articles 21, 24, 25, and 28 respectively include: the
compliance with the requirements of tiered system for cybersecurity
protections; the authentication of users’ real identity; the formulation of
cybersecurity emergency strategies; the assistance and support for
investigative authorities.180
The panic caused by all the obligations that the companies have to
abide by, may be unsubstantiated.181 The new Law brings back the
concept of the “tiered system” of cybersecurity protections, familiar to
businesses, which have complied with 1994 Regulations for Safety
https://hk.lexiscn.com/latest_message.php?id=241041&isSearchResult=1&url=news.php%2
53Fact%253Ddetail%2526id%253D241041&access=content_detail&lang=cn (“[t]he Draft
for Comment sets forth procedures, key points and methods for the security assessment of the
cross-border transfer of personal information and important data”) (citing to关于征求《信息
技术 安全技术 匿名实体鉴别 第4部分：基于弱秘密的机制》等6项国家标准意见的通
, National Information Security Standardization Technocal Committee (Aug. 30, 2017,
http://www.tc260.org.cn/zdetail_g.jsp?id=20170830193813).
176. Baker & McKenzie, supra note 158.
177. Dong, supra note 152, at 2.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Yang, supra note 167 (The Administrative Measures for Hierarchical Protection
of Information Security in 2007 also classified information into tiers with higher ones
concerning national security issues).
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Protection of Computer Information Systems.182 Rules regarding
network access, domain registration, fixed or mobile phone, information
publication and instant messaging services, which require users to
provide their real identity information, are restatements of the Decision
of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on
Strengthening Network Information Protection (2012).183 The fact that
the Law incorporates multiple restatements of the older regulations
signifies that businesses, with established presence in China, may have
compliance polices already in place and should not worry about the new
Law’s requirements.184
However, grounds for worrying still exist. The provision requiring
certification for important network equipment and software, for instance
seems deceitful.185 As foreign companies, aware of China’s pirating
history, fear that compliance will require turning over security keys and
core tech, which could be “shared with” state-owned competitors.186
Similarly, Article 10’s provision, requiring the construction and
operation of Internet services that are secure and stable, are likely to
advantage Chinese hardware firms like Lenovo and Huawei and local
cloud operating providers like Tencent or Alibaba.187
Article 65 provides that KII operators might violate the Law if their
products or services have not passed safety inspections.188 A threat of
such violations of the Law is especially worrisome because the nature of
the safety inspections remains unclear.189 In a similar fashion, Article 21
states that “specialized network security products” must meet a set of
standards released in a “catalog” by the State Council, which are yet to
be revealed.190
4. Government supervision, security reviews, and technical
support
The security reviews for information and communications
technology products and services under new rules constitute technical
barriers to trade under the World Trade Organization and may
potentially undermine the security of data.191
According to the CSL, network operators must provide technical
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Id.
Id.
China Adopts a Tough Law, supra note 142.
Id.
Id.
Horwitz, supra note 180.
Id.
Id.
E.g., Controversial Cybersecurity Law, supra note 112.
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support and assistance to public or national security agencies when
investigating a crime.192 Additionally, network operators are required to
adopt technical measures to oversee and record their operations and to
preserve related logs for at least 6 months.193
Also, under Article 22, network and service providers have to
inform the users and relevant authorities if any security or bug has been
detected.194 This requirement obligates providers to offer constant
security maintenance and prohibits them from installing malware in their
products.195 Article 23 requires key network facilities to comply with
relevant
national
standards
and
compulsory
certification
requirements.196 For example, such facilities can only be offered for sale
once they have complied with the certification provision from the
qualified organization.197 All the unnecessary burdens for network
operators and service providers contribute to the overall apprehension of
the China’s market participants.
5. Protection of Personal Information.
Regarding the protection of personal information, the CSL restates
the obligations, which have already existed across the PRC’s laws and
regulations.198
The familiar privacy laws’ requirements restated in the new
Cybersecurity Law include informed consent and the use of personal
information only for a purpose agreed upon by the relevant individual.199
Provisions on the collection and use of the personal information also
reiterate the “principles of legitimacy, rightfulness and necessity.”200
Article 42 requires the adoption of security protection measures for
personal information and incorporates new provisions like data breach
notification requirements and data depersonalization as an exception to

192. Privacy & Information, supra note 175 (“If it is ultimately unwilling to offer
reciprocal access to its own market, China cannot assume that it will indefinitely continue to
enjoy open and unhindered access to the [other]’s,” the EU Chamber president Joerg Wuttke
said).
193. Id.
194. Dong, supra note 152, at 2–3.
195. Id. at 3.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Dong, supra note 152, at 3 (See the Decision of the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress on Strengthening Network Information Protection (2012), the
Provisions on the Protection of Personal Information of Users of Telecommunications and
Internet Services (2013) and the Law on the Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests
(2013 Revision)).
199. Privacy & Information, supra note 175.
200. Id.; See Article 41, Law, note 151 (quoting the Article).
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inform and consent requirements.201 The consent exception for data that
cannot identify specific individuals “is believed to be a major win for
companies engaging in Big Data business such as online precision
marketing companies using cookies technologies.”202 The breach
notification requirements, introduced for the first time, might magnify
the adverse effects to the public image of the data controllers and
processors.203 Therefore, companies should consider this when
developing crisis management strategies.204
Article 43 adds an individual right to question the correctness or
request deletion of personal information in cases where the information
is inaccurate or used for a purpose not agreed upon.205 Additionally, theft
and illegal sale of personal data have already been criminalized in China
under Amendment No. 7 (2009) and Amendment No. 9 (2015) to the
PRC Criminal Law.206 These penalties for breach are considerably
harsher than the ones before:
Breach of the new law will be subject to, according to the seriousness
of the breach, penalties such as warning, order of correction, fines
(up to RMB 1,000,000), forfeiture of illegal gains, suspension of
business, and/or revocation of operation permit and business license.
Individual wrongdoers are also subject to a fine of up to RMB
1,000,000, detention, fixed-term or lifetime ban for key positions in
the network security and network operation areas, and/or even
criminal penalties.207

B. The CSL’s vague language
China critics say the country uses extremely vague wording in its
legislations to give flexibility to policymakers on how to implement
laws.208 Keeping the laws so vague that they are impossible to follow,
has essentially been a “tried-and-true tactic” employed by the PRC to
keep foreign companies away from China.209 The unfortunate lack of
clarity on how to comply with the Law is a huge turn off for overseas
enterprises.210 “Foreign companies who have the technology and have
the impetus to get into the China [are] not getting the necessary

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Dong, supra note 152, at 3.
Yang, supra note 167.
Id.
Id.
Dong, supra note 152, at 3.
Yang, supra note 167.
Id.
Id.
Horwitz, supra note 180.
Id.
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information to do so. And since the information isn’t there, they’re shut
out of the market.”211
The CSL puts businesses in danger of government meddling or
losing business in the world’s second largest economy. Uncertain, vague
language of the Law creates an uncertain business environment. Foreign
companies willing to see how this Law untangles will no doubt have a
chance to succeed, but the risk is real and the penalties for noncompliance are harsh. After June 2017, the foreign investors tempted
into entering the Chinese market are bound to face challenges directly
related to the new Law.
On the positive side, the regulations might not significantly change
the ordinary course of business.212 Many of the rules have already been
in effect, just not codified. Samuel Yang Honqquan, a partner of AnJie
Law Firm suggests that:
[I]nstead of trying to seek the hidden meanings of the new law and
overstating its downsides, [foreign companies doing business in
China] should watch closely the policy changes in their own
industries where special rules may be issued by the regulators having
a more direct impact on the ways of doing business of these foreign
companies.213

V. PROPOSAL
Cybersecurity has become a significant area of international and
domestic concern.214 To address this issue the United States and China
have released various cybersecurity strategies.215 Unfortunately, those
strategies did not gain much momentum. These two superpowers need
a more viable strategy that will actually stick.
Security surveillance and cyber confrontations that the United
States and China engage in, hurt both countries’ economies and
undermines the protections of their IP networks. China’s vague laws and
overreaching security requirements restrict freedom of speech and throw
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up barriers to global companies. In the United States, cyberspace is
talked about like it is the ocean, where nobody owns it and people can
just traverse through it as they please.216 U.S. companies like AT&T or
Verizon, actually own quite a bit of it.217 And even though federal
government cannot always compel everyone to act,218 the cyber-law
literature suggests that cyberspace can be effectively regulated
considering that physical facilities that make the online activity possible
are subject to government control.219 Additionally, companies have to
themselves strive to improve the infrastructure within the private
sector.220
The cyber community points out that certain national government
actions may negatively affect another nation or its citizens.221 “As one
national government doesn’t have sovereignty over another, the latter’s
behavior will not be subject to former’s regulations.”222 This presents a
great flaw in the international law, and limits what a nation like the
United States can do in response to another nation’s, such as China’s,
aggressive attack, or vice versa.223
Luckily, the PRC is not completely averse to international
cooperation on cybersecurity.224 Even though unsurprisingly, China’s
and other countries’ “International Code of Conduct for Information
Security” proposal defended the legitimacy of the governments’ control
of the online flow of information, read positively, it did try setting at
least some rules for proper cybersecurity behavior.225
Because both countries’ privacy and cybersecurity systems are
flawed, but not hopelessly so, I propose the European Union approach
to cybersecurity which rejects an idea of governmental scrutiny and a
contention that civil societies cannot have free will when it comes to the
use of technology.226
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Cyberattacks have increased in scope and quantity in recent years.
They undermine not only national security of the countries around the
world, but also the free flow of information and free trade. Thus, an
international cybersecurity treaty is in order. However, such a treaty
would only be successful if the principal actors of the global community
would craft something mutually beneficial and make an earnest effort to
comply with it, leading by example. Super powers feel like they have to
support a defensive and offensive approach in their military and
economic cyber policies, but when it comes to civil societies,
governments are not as compelled to defend them.227 The EU stands for
an approach that gives the civil societies a sense of security they need
when it comes to cyber threats.228 Unlike the United States and China,
that approach the issue of security in cyberspace through the logic of
national security and cyber superiority, the EU approach is legalistic and
protective.229 The EU cybersecurity concept focuses on fighting
cybercrime, and on resilience to ensure rapid recovery from cyber
attacks.230 EU capability development focuses on building capacities
that enable detection, response, and recovery from sophisticated cyber
threats.231 In the military field, the EU is engaged in cyber selfprotection and assured access to cyber space to enable its operations and
missions.232
At this point, the EU can help build consensus on cyber-security
issues in the international community. Also, if both the United States
and China would support a European framework regarding
cybersecurity, the EU would be more open to establishing definite
international norms that would prevent the threat of covert offenses by
various states.
CONCLUSION
It is incredibly difficult to justify a Law which places censors on
the freedom of expression, is costly for trade and innovation, and creates
friction between the global powers. Terrorism, whether in the physical
world or cyber realm, does not exist because of Google or Facebook, as
China implicates. Social media, which does not promote an immoral
society or uncivilized behavior, could even work to China’s favor in
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advancement “of the core socialist values.”233 In addition, other ways
exist to address the growing threats of cyberattacks domestically and on
the global arena. China’s sweeping new Cybersecurity Law is not one
of those ways.
Chinese officials should listen to Eric Xu,234 who more than a year
ago warned: “If we’re not open, if we don’t bring in the world’s best
technology, we’ll never have true information security.”235 That
eloquent rejection of techno-nationalism came from a man who is cochief executive of Huawei.236
The United States is likewise not cyber efficient at the moment.
The country often engages in political espionage and hacking with the
goal of preventing terrorist attacks, yet at the same time, it critiques
similar actions coming from the Chinese government. At some point the
United States has to become more concerned about public use of
protective technologies and less involved in the behavior that
perpetuates the conflict between the two countries.
Since neither country’s cybersecurity strategies have worked much
to their advantage, both the United States and China need to consider
taking a different route. The EU approach can not only be beneficial to
both superpowers, but also unify the rest of the international community
on issues surrounding cybersecurity. Cybersecurity is inherently
transnational. Thus, China cannot isolate itself from the rest of the
world, as the country wants to do. For the United States, a new strategy
would give an opportunity to improve and focus on the protective means
of cybersecurity, which in turn will help fight the cybercrimes and
prevent the unwanted cyberattacks.
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